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COMMENT
EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY AND ANTITRUST
CONSIDERATIONS IN "VOLUNTARY"
LIMITS ON STEEL IMPORTS
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 14, 1969, it was announced that Japanese and Euro-
pean steel producers had agreed to accept voluntary restraints on the
export of steel to the United States.1 The manner of the announcement
was well calculated to stress both the official character of the agreement,
and the degree to which it had the enthusiastic support of the admin-
istration. The announcement was made jointly by the chairmen of the
House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Finance Com-
mittee. The substance of the announcement was that they had received
a letter from the Secretary of State informing them that "[t] he Presi-
dent has asked me to transmit to you communications" from Japanese
and European steel producers declaring their intent to limit exports to
the United States. The accompanying press release reproduced the
Secretary of State's letter, followed by letters from the Japanese and
European steel industries addressed to the Secretary of State.2
The Japanese and Europeans agreed to limit their exports to the
United States to 5.75 million net tons each in 1969, and to limit growth
in these exports to five per cent in the two following years.3 Limitations
of this sort serve to insulate American producers from a major source
of competition and to erect barriers to international trade; therefore,
they are inconsistent both with the policy of the antitrust laws and with
national legislation and policy with regard to international trade.' Of
course, this need not be a bar to their legality. If the limitations were
enacted in the form of quota legislation, there could be no doubt about
their legal validity. On the other hand, if they had been the result ex-
clusively of direct negotiations between the American, European, and
Japanese industries, such an agreement would constitute a clear vio-
lation of the antitrust laws0 Neither of these courses was followed.
The procedure that produced the steel arrangement is difficult to
categorize for legal purposes. The pressure of the steel industry for
protection from imports led to the introduction of a quota bill in the
1 House Committee on Ways and Means, Senate Finance Committee, Joint Press
Release, Jan. 14, 1969.
2Id.
aId.
4 Text accompanying notes 88-101 infra.
6 Text accompanying note 34 infra.
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Senate in 1967.' Despite sympathetic treatment by the Senate Finance
Committee, the bill met with the opposition of the Johnson admin-
istration,7 which was opposed to quota legislation.8 Following an offer
by the Japanese industry to negotiate voluntary restraints, the bill was
shelved by the Finance Committee in July, 1968.' Thereupon repre-
sentatives of the European and Japanese industries began negotiations
with State Department officials. While there were few or no direct
contacts between the foreign producers and the American industry, the
State Department conducted the negotiations in close consultation with
the American industry. In effect, the role of the State Department was
to represent the American industry, while at the same time implement-
ing the administration's policy of avoiding quota legislation.
Like the State Department, the foreign producers were relieved at
the shelving of the quota bill, which was the object of the Japanese offer
to restrict shipments to the United States.' They seized the initiative
in pressing for the arrangement, but they did so under the very sub-
stantial threat of the quota bill. The American industry protested the
shelving of the bill," and continued to express dissatisfaction even after
final agreement was reached.' (In fact, an iron and steel quota bill
has been reintroduced in the 91st Congress.' 3) It seems nonetheless
that they accepted, at least for the time being, the voluntary arrangement
as the most satisfactory and realistic alternative available, and did every-
thing they could to make it as favorable as possible.
The procedure adopted was thus carefully engineered to avoid
legislation on the one hand, and illegality, especially violation of the
antitrust laws, on the other. This was done by keeping the whole affair
under the aegis and ostensibly even under the direct control of the
government, in order to take advantage of a judicially created exemp-
tion from the antitrust laws where a restraint of trade takes the form of
seeking to induce governmental action.'" It is the contention of this
Comment that the participation of the executive branch in the negotia-
tion of the steel arrangement did not immunize it from antitrust ille-
gality. On the contrary, it created a dangerous precedent: the use of
s S. 2537, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1964).
7 See, e.g., Hearings on Import Quota Legislation Before the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 8-14 [hereinafter cited as Hearings] (statement
of Secretary Rusk).
8 Notes 21 and 24 infra.
9 Wall Street Journal, July 10, 1968, at 32, col. 2. A previous Japanese offer of
voluntary restraints had already been made in March. Id., Oct. 30, 1968, at 16, col. 2.
I' Id., July 11, 1968, at 6, col. 2.
11 Id., July 12, 1968, at 5, col. 2.
12 Id., Jan. 16, 1969, at 12, col. 1. Despite the protests, an industry analyst was
quoted as saying "[t]he mills will make noises, but they'll be satisfied because they
know the quotas aren't going to get anywhere in Congress."
13 S. 1164, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). The bill was introduced into the Senate
by Senator Hartke on Feb. 25, 1969, and has been sent to the Senate Finance Com-
mittee. CCH CONG. INDEX, 91st CONG., 1969-70, at 2045-3.
14 Text accompanying notes 48-80 infra.
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covert collaboration between private parties and government officials,
devoid of publicity and the panoply of procedural safeguards usually
required in making major policy decisions, to secure a result which is
inconsistent not only with the antitrust laws, but also with our ex-
pressed policy and statutory regulation of our foreign trade and our
international commitments.
II. THE NEGOTIATION OF THE STEEL AGREEMENT
Between 1956 and 1967, steel consumption in the United States
rose by 23 per cent. Five per cent came from domestic producers, and
the remaining 18 from foreign imports; '- in 1968, 17 million tons of
steel were imported, constituting approximately 16 per cent of total
domestic consumption."0 Between 1957 and 1967, the net return on
investment in the steel industry fell from 13.2 per cent to 7.4 per cent.
The national average for all industries in 1967 was 12.5 per centY
Recently, no more than 50 per cent of domestic capacity has been used
in slack periods; this figure did not exceed 80 per cent even during
the period of heavy strike-hedge buying in the summer of 1968.1 It
has been reported that the steel industry, in the middle of a program of
heavy investment to modernize steel production, is planning to abandon
large portions of the program, and shut plants instead of modernizing
them.'9 The industry now maintains that consumption of domestically
produced steel must increase by at least 2 to 2.5 million tons annually
in order to support the investment necessary to prevent a further de-
terioration of the competitive position of the domestic industry.20
Clearly these facts, and especially the competition of foreign imports,
as well as substitutes like aluminum, plastic and cement, present a criti-
cal problem for the steel industry.2
15 Wall Street Journal, Dec. 19, 1968, at 1, col. 6.
'1 Id., Jan. 8, 1969, at 20, col. 4.
17 Id., Dec. 19, 1968, at 1, col. 6.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Larry, A Debate on Steel Protectionism-I, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 8, 1969,
at 12, col. 3; Letter from John P. Roche, President of the American Iron and Steel
Institute, to Representative Wilbur D. Mills, Jan. 15, 1969.
21 Naturally, there is a multitude of conflicting views on the plight of the steel
industry. See, e.g., AMEiCAN IRON AND STEEL INsTITUTE, THE STEEL IMPORT
PROBLEM (1968) ; STAFF OF SENATE COMM. oN FINANCE, 90TH CONG., 1ST SEss., STEEL
IMPORTS (Comm. Print 1967) ; Hearings, pt. 2, at 818-78; Adams & Dirlam, Big Steel,
Invention, and Innovation, 80 Q.J. EcoN. 167, 184-87 (1966); Larry, A Debate on
Steel Protectionisn--I, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 8, 1969, at 12, col. 3; Thorn, A
Debate on Steel Protectionisn-II, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 9, 1969, at 12, col. 3;
Wall Street Journal, Dec. 19, 1968, at 1, col. 6.
Supporters of quota legislation tend to stress low foreign labor costs, the power
of domestic unions, inflation, and support of foreign producers by their governments.
They emphasize the need to maintain a large steel producing capacity as the founda-
tion of the national defense. Opponents point to the failure of the industry to adopt
major technological improvements such as the basic oxygen furnace, and its policy
of raising prices in the face of foreign price competition. They argue that if the
industry cannot compete effectively with foreign importers, normal market forces
should be left to produce a reallocation of resources in the manner suggested by classic
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The industry's response has not been lacking in candor:
The world of trade which steel must confront [wrote an in-
dustry executive recently] is anything but a world of free
trade.
. . . [W]e should and we must move in tactical and prac-
tical ways wherever, as in the case of steel, there is a critical
problem-even if so doing may offend long-term theory in
which all of us, including those of us in steel, still believe."
The industry began discussions with government officials on the
steel problem at the time the steel bill was introduced in the Senate in
1967.2 In these discussions, the industry was represented by a small
group of at least five individuals who were executives and legal counsel
of the major American steel corporations (hereinafter referred to as the
Steel Representatives). They planned and implemented the industry's
strategy, and were continually in contact with the management of the
major steel companies.
The Steel Representatives' first action was to arrange meetings
with the appropriate departments of the federal government in order to
present the industry's problem. The first meeting was held in November,
1967, primarily for orientation purposes. The government officials
who attended the meeting were mostly from the State Department. At
a second meeting in December, 1967, the Steel Representatives held more
detailed discussions with technical personnel of the State Department.
In January, and in February of 1968 there were further meetings with
officials of the Commerce Department and the Secretary of the Treasury
respectively. From these meetings it became apparent that the State
Department officials were the most sympathetic to the industry's plight,
and no further meetings were held with other departments.
In the spring of 1968, Mr. Inayama, chairman of the Japan Iron
and Steel Exporting Association, visited the United States on his way
to Europe. In talks with State Department officials, he indicated that
the Japanese steel producers would be willing to accept voluntary limits
free trade theory. They also maintain that the imposition of quotas could not be
conducive to the health of the industry, since it would remove the incentive for
efficiency.
It should be noted that it is the second of these two positions that corresponds
most nearly to that of the Johnson Administration, Hearings, pt. 1, at 8-14 (statement
of Secretary Rusk), which negotiated the steel arrangement on the American side in
order to avoid quota legislation.
22 Larry, A Debate on Steel Protectionism-I, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 8, 1969,
at 12, col. 3.
2 Much of the information on which this account is based was obtained in inter-
views with steel executives and State Department officials. A constant preoccupation
of the participants in the arrangement was the possibility that it would run afoul of
the antitrust laws. In view of the sensitivity of the subject, it has not been possible
to give the names of the individuals who supplied information. Further footnotes
indicate where this is the case.
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on exports to the United States, if steel producers in other exporting
nations would do the same. Mr. Inayama offered to talk to European
steel interests about the matter while he was in Europe. This offer was
made in the shadow of the quota bill which would have imposed much
harsher limits than the importers ever offered to accept "voluntarily."
The Japanese government avoided involvement in the discussions
and told the State Department to negotiate directly with the Japanese
industry. The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry
opposed the limits on the ground that other American industries might
also seek "voluntary" ceilings, but finally acquiesced in the negotiations
because of the apparent strength of American protectionist sentiment. 24
The European steel industry also indicated that it would consider
voluntary restraints. Like the Japanese government, the European
governments refused to become involved; therefore, the State Depart-
ment dealt directly with the European industry. Thus the only parties
with which the State Department negotiated were private. There were
no talks or agreement at the diplomatic level.
In July, 1968, the Japanese industry made the offer of voluntary
restraints that led to the shelving of the quota bill. The offer was to
hold exports to 5.5 million tons in 1969 and hold further annual in-
creases to 7 per cent.' A previous Japanese proposal, made in March,
had been to limit shipments to 5 million tons with further annual in-
creases of no more than 10 per cent. 6 The announcement of the July
offer was made through the Reuters wire service and not through the
State Department.
The American steel industry rejected this offer. The response
was drawn up by the Steel Representatives, approved by the steel in-
dustry management, and then released to the press by the President of
the American Iron and Steel Institute (hereinafter referred to as
AISI) 7 In this way, inter-industry communication via the press and
wire services served as an independent channel in the negotiation of the
agreement. However, the discussions continued between the Steel
Representatives and the State Department, and among the State Depart-
ment, the Japanese, and the European industries.
When the final agreement was reached, the Steel Representatives
and State Department officials discussed the manner in which it should
be announced. On the advice of private counsel and Justice Depart-
ment lawyers, they decided to make use of "official" channels to avoid
any conflict with the antitrust laws. The Justice Department took the
position that as long as the arrangement involved governmental action,
2AWall Street Journal, July 11, 1968, at 6, col. 3. Bills had been introduced in
the Senate to impose quotas not only on steel but also on textiles, meat, dairy products,
oil, lead and zinc, glass, and other commodities. Hearings passim. Secretary Rusk
estimated the value of imports that would be affected if all the quota bills were enacted
at "$5 or $6 billion or more." Hearings, pt. 1, at 12.
25Wall Street Journal, July 11, 1968, at 6, col. 2.26 1d., Oct. 30, 1968, at 3, col. 2.
27Id., July 12, 1968, at 5, col. 2.
19691
110 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
and as long as the State Department's role could not be characterized
as that of a mere conduit, no contention that the agreement violated the
antitrust laws could be sustained. In addition, the Japanese and Euro-
pean industries were advised to formulate their acceptance of the agree-
ment in the form of a "statement of intent." Naturally, the wording
of the Japanese and European statements were very similar." To
alleviate fears of antitrust illegality, the representative of the German
steel producers' association sent a draft of the statement of intent to
State Department officials requesting them to have the Justice Depart-
ment endorse it as inoffensive to American antitrust laws. Apparently
this was done.'
Upon receipt of the statements of intent by the State Department,
the Steel Representatives drafted a response and sent it to AISI's ex-
ecutive board, a body which consists of the executive officers of all the
important American steel companies. The draft was adopted unani-
mously by the executive board and announced to the press by AISI's
president.30
The interests most adversely affected by the agreement, the steel
importers and processors of imported steel, were not represented in the
discussions, although they had been given substantial attention in the
hearings on the steel quota bill.3 The State Department did, however,
receive a complaint during the negotiations from one affected group,
the Independent Wire Drawers' Association."
The arrangement does not constitute a contract enforceable by the
American steel industry or the State Department. However, the con-
tinuing possibility of quota legislation should prove sufficient to induce
the Japanese and European industries to live up to their undertaking
to police the restraints themselves. A major topic in the discussions
between the Steel Representatives and the State Department was the
question of the control and policing of the restraints. Steps to meet
the American industry's fears have been taken by the foreign producers.
The Japanese control mechanism will consist of an iron and steel export
company through which all Japanese steel exports to the United States
are to be channeled, and which has been approved by the Japanese
Ministry of International Trade and Industry. Control presents little
problem in Europe, where the steel industry is virtually cartelized, and
is regulated by the European Coal and Steel Community. In addition,
2 8 See Memorandum from Yoshihiro Inayama, Chairman, Japan Iron & Steel
Exporters' Association, to the Secretary of State, Dec. 23, 1968; Letter from the
Association of the Steel Producers of the ECSC to the Secretary of State, Dec. 18,
1968; both reproduced in House Committee on Ways and Means, Senate Finance
Committee, Joint Press Release, Jan. 14, 1969.
29 Note 23 supra.
30 Wall Street Journal, Jan. 16, 1969, at 12, col. 1.
31 See Hearings, pt. 2, at 818-978. A recurring theme of the users of imported
steel was that the effect of a steel quota would be to compel them to rely on the large,
integrated domestic producers, with the result that they might be put out of business.
32 Note 23 supra.
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imports into the United States will be closely monitored by the Business
and Defense Services Division of the Department of Commerce, and
the American industry will closely scrutinize Bureau of Census reports
on steel imports to detect violations of the agreement. Problems of
control will be handled through the State Department.
III. THE STEEL ARRANGEMENT AS A CONSPIRACY IN
RESTRAINT OF TRADE
To the extent that it seeks to control the competition of foreign
imports, there can be no doubt that the steel arrangement is "in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States, [and] with
foreign nations" within the meaning of section one of the Sherman Act.
33
Combinations "formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising,
depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in
interstate or foreign commerce" have been found to be illegal per se.
34
It is clear that limits on steel imports, whether effected by quota legis-
lation or by voluntary restraints, are intended to stabilize prices. Agree-
ments to limit production or protect territorial markets are also con-
demned under the Sherman Act. 5
The question remains whether, leaving aside any possible exemp-
tion from the antitrust laws resulting from the participation of the State
Department, the steel arrangement constitutes a "contract, combination
. . . or conspiracy" within the meaning of the Act.36  The arrange-
ment lends itself to characterization as a conspiracy in restraint of trade
in a number of different ways. It may be argued that there was a con-
spiracy among American producers to induce the import limits; or
among the foreign producers to induce and implement them. However,
the theory upon which this Comment will focus is that there was a con-
spiracy between the American, Japanese, and European producers-to
limit competition in the American steel market.
A clear case of a section 1 violation would exist if, as a result of
direct negotiations between American and foreign producers, an agree-
ment had been explicitly reached whereby the American producers
promised to drop their campaign for quota legislation, in exchange for
a promise by foreign producers to limit their exports to the United
States. The actual course of events differed substantially from this
simple model. No explicit agreement as such was reached; instead,
there exist only the "statements of intent" of the foreign producers and
their subsequent behavior implementing them. There was no obvious
direct communication between American and foreign producers; rather,
there was apparently some exchange of signals via the press and wire
33 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
34 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
3 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United
States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
3615 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
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services, and some indirect communication via the State Department.
Finally, the American industry gave up nothing in exchange for the
statements of intent. It continued to make much show of its dis-
satisfaction and preference for legislation, even after the voluntary
limitations were announced; and the steel quota bill has been reintro-
duced into the present Congress.
7
The cases are full of language to the effect that evidence which
falls short of an express written or oral agreement may be sufficient to
establish a conspiracy under the Sherman Act, and that circumstantial
evidence may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof. In American
Tobacco Co. v. United States,"5 the Supreme Court said:
It is not the form of the combination or the particular
means used but the result to be achieved that the statute con-
demns. It is not of importance whether the means used to ac-
complish the unlawful objective are in themselves lawful or
unlawful. Acts done to give effect to the conspiracy may be
in themselves wholly innocent acts. Yet, if they are part of
the sum of the acts which are relied upon to effectuate the con-
spiracy which the statute forbids, they come within its pro-
hibition. No formal agreement is necessary to constitute an
unlawful conspiracy. . . . Where the circumstances are such
as to warrant a jury in finding that the conspirators had a
unity of purpose or a common design and understanding, or
a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement, the conclu-
sion that a conspiracy is established is justified."'
Language of this sort is usually found in cases involving refusals
to deal 40 or conscious parallelism.4 While neither situation is pre-
sented here, these cases serve to illustrate that the existence of an un-
lawful combination depends on what the parties actually did, rather than
the words they used.
Even if the American industry campaigned for steel quota legis-
lation with a good faith intent to have the legislation passed, it was
under the coercion of this threat that the Japanese industry made its
initial offers for voluntary restraints. According to the Japanese ac-
count, these offers were made so that the bill would be dropped and
the way would be open for the negotiation of a less damaging voluntary
agreement. The parties set the framework for the negotiations by the
public announcement, through the wire services and press, of the Japa-
37 See notes 12 and 13 supra.
38 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
39 Id. at 809-10.
40 See, e.g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
41 See, e.g., Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346
U.S. 537 (1954); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
See generally Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Con-
scions Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REv. 655 (1962).
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nese offer and its rejection by the Americans in July, 1968. Thereafter,
the foreign producers only communicated directly with the State De-
partment. But the State Department's position in these negotiations
was necessarily that of the American steel industry, with which it re-
mained constantly in touch. Since the State Department's motive was
to satisfy the steel industry while avoiding quota legislation, the logic
of its position required that it represent the steel industry as adequately
as it could. And it is clear that, regardless of its preference for legis-
lation, the American industry neglected no opportunity to inform the
State Department of its needs. There was thus an exchange of views
by indirect means with the intention, on both sides, of establishing
voluntary restraints on imports.
Objections to this contention are concerned principally with the
degree to which the arrangement lacks the elements of a valid contract.
The arrangement certainly does not constitute an enforceable agreement.
Furthermore, the American producers have not undertaken to give any-
thing in exchange for the restraints. Indeed, they are still apparently
campaigning actively for quota legislation.
But it is clear that the elements of contractual validity are not
necessary in the case of a conspiracy under the Sherman Act. In Inter-
state Circuit, Inc. v. United States,' the Supreme Court said:
It is elementary that an unlawful conspiracy may be and
often is formed without simultaneous action or agreement on
the part of the conspirators. . . . Acceptance by competitors,
without previous agreement, of an invitation to participate in
a plan, the necessary consequence of which, if carried out, is
restraint of interstate commerce, is sufficient to establish an
unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman Act.43
That case involved a conspiracy between various film distributors and a
chain of first-run theaters in Texas to force second-run theaters to
charge higher admission prices and to abandon double-features. The
theater chain had sent identical letters to each distributor, each letter
having the names of all the distributors on it, soliciting these measures.
The court said that it was not necessary to show actual agreement be-
tween the distributors. "It was enough that, knowing that concerted
action was contemplated and invited, the distributors gave their ad-
herence to the scheme and participated in it." "' There was no ex-
plicitly articulated agreement between the distributors, although there
had been direct negotiations between the distributors individually and
the theater chain. Evidently the structure of the conspiracy involved in
Interstate Circuit was very different from that involved in the steel
arrangement. The point is that the contours of an illegal conspiracy
42306 U.S. 208 (1939).
43Id. at 227.
44Id. at 226.
19691
114 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
need not resemble those of a contractual agreement. It is enough that
each party take steps towards the object of the conspiracy, relying on
an understanding, however communicated, that the other party is also
taking steps toward that object.
Furthermore, the substance of the steel arrangement has been
clearly articulated in the "statements of intent" of the foreign producers.
A vital part of the arrangement is the system of controls set up as a
result of the negotiations. In the light of the continuing pressure for
quota legislation by the steel industry, the foreign producers presently
have very good reasons to observe their undertakings as scrupulously
as possible. While the prospects of the bill currently in Congress may
not presently appear good, protectionist sentiment is strong enough to
make the foreign producers careful not to strengthen it further. Thus
there is in effect an enforcement system in the arrangement, consisting
of the combination of the control measures set up by the negotiations,
and the continuing threat of protectionist legislation.
A further possible difficulty in characterizing the steel arrangement
as a conspiracy under the Sherman Act is that the American industry
has not given up anything as its side of the bargain. Instead, it has
continued to express its dissatisfaction and the steel quota bill has been
reintroduced, despite the fact that both statements of intent explicitly
outline as a condition of the restraints that "the United States" take no
further action limiting steel imports.1
The prospects of the quota bill do not seem any better under the
Nixon administration than they did under Johnson's." The steel in-
dustry has several good reasons for continuing its campaign for legis-
lation even if the bill is not passed. It has the effect of applying
consistent pressure on the foreign producers. Its further utility lies in
the fact that it supports the argument under discussion that the industry
has not agreed to anything. Until legislation is actually passed, Ameri-
can producers can rest secure in the knowledge that the foreign pro-
ducers remain bound by the terms of their statements of intent to abide
by the restraints, and that they have every reason for not stepping out
of line.
Even if the quota legislation were finally passed, that would not
prevent the steel arrangement as it is presently functioning from being
considered a conspiracy in restraint of trade. This becomes clear when
the situation is stated in its simplest terms: A wishes to impose on B
restraints of trade favorable to A and harmful to B. B offers a compro-
mise measure the implementation of which it believes will make it im-
possible for A to secure the full measures that it desires. A recognizes
that the fact of B's offer has probably made it impossible for A to get
its full measures. The terms of the compromise measure are then
45 See Press Release, supra note 1.
4 6 Wall Street Journal, Apr. 22, 1969, at 22, col. 2 (quoting President Nixon
as saying that the issue of foreign steel imports has been "pretty well resolved" by
the voluntary restraints agreement).
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worked out by consultation between A and B. Each has, for the time
being, secured the most favorable outcome then feasible for it. There is
no reason why, in this situation, the fact that A keeps pressing for the
full measures that it wanted in the first place prevents the compromise
from being aptly characterized as an agreement in restraint of trade.
This is precisely the case of the steel arrangement.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE CAMPAIGN FOR QUOTA LEGISLATION AND
THE PARTICIPATION OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT
The negotiation of the steel arrangement was carefully conducted
to cast the Government as the principal, and, for the sake of appearances,
the only party on the American side. Representatives of the steel
industry who were interviewed left no doubt that one of the purposes
of this was to immunize the arrangement from any antitrust illegality. 7
In evaluating the success of the attempt, it is important to stress again
certain aspects of the relationships between the parties involved. Once
the quota legislation was shelved, the American producers were con-
cerned to ensure that the voluntary restraints were as favorable to
themselves as possible. The meetings between members of the Steel
Representatives and State Department officials can be described both
as attempts to solicit action by government officials and as the utiliza-
tion by the American industry of governmental officials as channels of
communication with the foreign producers. Neither description does
violence to the English language. At the same time, the role of the
State Department officials was by no means entirely passive. They
were trying to satisfy the American producers, but they were also
effectuating a policy of the Administration-the avoidance of quota
legislation. In this sense, the State Department was itself a third, in-
dependent party to the arrangement.
A. The Noerr-Pennington Defense
The doctrine whose protection the negotiators of the steel arrange-
ment were seeking is the judicially created exemption from the antitrust
laws where certain kinds of governmental action are involved in con-
spiracies in restraint of trade. It rests on a small number of cases,
whose precise limits are unclear.
48
The earlier cases were principally concerned with the problem of
combinations of private persons acting under color of law. In United
States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc.,49 the Government brought an
action to enforce an order of the Secretary of Agriculture issued pur-
suant to the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937.0 The
4 7 Note 23 supra.
48 See generally Costilo, Antitrust's Newest Quagmire: The Noerr-Pennington
Defense, 66 Micr. L. REv. 333 (1967).
4) 307 U.S. 533 (1939).
W Act of June 3, 1937, ch. 296, 50 Stat. 246.
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order established a system of uniform prices to be paid by "handlers"
(dealers) to producers for milk in a designated area. Against the op-
position of the handlers, the order had been promulgated in accordance
with an elaborate procedure prescribed in the statute and described at
length in the opinion,51 requiring, among other things, a two-thirds
affirmative vote of the milk producers. The handlers primarily at-
tempted to challenge the validity of the act and order, but they also
asserted that the order was adopted under circumstances too uncon-
scionable to permit its enforcement by a court of equity. Although the
opinion is not entirely clear on this point, one of the contentions was
that the scheme and the conduct of the producers violated the Sherman
Act. This allegation was buttressed by evidence that the producers had
sought to compel acceptance of the order by the handlers by refusing to
supply them with milk. The Court dismissed this argument with the
statement that:
If ulterior motives of corporate aggrandizement stimulated
their activities, their efforts were not thereby rendered unlaw-
ful. If the Act and Order are otherwise valid, the fact that
their effect would be to give cooperatives a monopoly of the
market would not violate the Sherman Act or justify refusal
of the injunction.5"
The next case to reach the Supreme Court was Parker v. Brown. 3
This was a suit to enjoin state officials from enforcing a program for
marketing raisins, involving price fixing. The program had been
adopted pursuant to a California statute providing for the establishment
of such programs in accordance with an elaborate procedure requiring
public hearings, an examining committee, and a vote of a specified per-
centage of the producers. The Court described these procedures in
detail at the beginning of the opinion,54 though it did not mention them
in dealing with the antitrust issue. One of the reasons given for en-
joining the program was that it conflicted with the Sherman Act. The
Court responded that the program was the action of the State and that
the vote of the producers was assimilated into such action since it was
provided for by statute.55 Apparently, it was principally concerned
with the delicate problems of state-federal relations and therefore con-
strued the Sherman Act as directed only against private business com-
binations and not against "state action or official action directed by a
state." 56 It felt compelled to reach this conclusion because "an unex-
51 307 U.S. at 542-48.
2Id. at 560.
53 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
54Id. at 346-47.
55 Id. at 350-52.
661d. at 351.
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pressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents
is not lightly to be attributed to Congress." 57
These two cases were the main precedents the Supreme Court
relied on in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc. 8 That case was an action for an injunction and treble
damages brought by a group of trucking companies against a group of
railroads. Among the allegations were that the railroads had conspired
to injure the truckers by mounting a publicity campaign to secure the
passage and retention of laws harmful to the truckers; that they had
influenced the Governor of Pennsylvania to veto a law which would
have increased the maximum weights for truck loads; and that the
publicity campaign had also been designed to injure the public image of
the truckers even if it failed to secure legislation. The railroads brought
counterclaims making similar allegations.
Citing Parker and Rock Royal, the Supreme Court first stated that
it has been held that where a restraint upon trade or monopo-
lization is the result of valid governmental action, as opposed
to private action, no violation of the Act can be made out.
These decisions rest upon the fact that under our form of
government the question whether a law of that kind should
pass, or if passed be enforced, is the responsibility of the ap-
propriate legislative or executive branch of government so
long as the law itself does not violate some provision of the
Constitution.P9
It went on to conclude that an association "to persuade the legislature
or the executive to take particular action with respect to a law that
would produce a restraint or a monopoly" must also be exempt.60
Agreements to seek legislation, said the Court, were very different from
agreements to use economic power or give up economic freedom. To
bring the former within the reach of the Act would hamstring the legis-
lative process and threaten the constitutionally protected right of peti-
tion. The Court added that the fact that deceptive practices had been
used in the publicity campaign did not alter this holding. It also refused
to sustain a finding of the lower court that the railroads had intended
to injure the truckers even if they did not secure legislation, since some
injury was a necessary incident to such campaigns for legislation.
The most recent case in which the Supreme Court allowed the
exemption is United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington."' There
a union welfare and retirement fund sued a small coal company for
royalty payments under a wage agreement. The company brought a
67 Id.
68365 U.S. 127 (1961).
69 Id. at 136.
60 Id.
61381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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cross claim against the union alleging various antitrust law violations.
Among the allegations were (1) that the union had, in conjunction
with the large coal companies, induced the Secretary of Labor to use
his authority under the Walsh-Healey Act 62 to establish minimum
wages for employees of contractors selling coal to the TVA at a high
level so as to make it difficult for small companies to compete; (2) that
the union and the large companies had urged the TVA to curtail its
spot market purchases, many of which were exempt from the Walsh-
Healey order; and (3) that several companies, including ones controlled
by the unions, had waged a destructive price-cutting campaign in the
TVA spot market for coal.
On appeal, one of the union's contentions was that there should
have been a new trial since admission of evidence of approaches to the
Secretary of Labor and the TVA was erroneous. The Court expressed
its agreement in some remarkably unqualified language:
Joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the anti-
trust laws even though intended to eliminate competition.
Such conduct is not illegal, either standing alone or as part of
a broader scheme itself violative of the Sherman Act.3
The issue was not before the Court, but this language is striking for
its failure to suggest any requirement that the solicited official action
be within the scope of the official's authority. An added ground for the
holding with respect to the approach to the Secretary of Labor was that
any injury sustained by the company in this connection would have
been the result of the acts, not of the union and the large companies,
but of the Secretary of Labor, and that no damages which were sus-
tained as a result of his acts could be collected. No similar statement
was made about the approach to the TVA.
The Court made a point of contrasting this situation with that in
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,4 the only case
in which the Supreme Court has refused to allow the exemption. Con-
tinental brought a treble damages action against Union Carbide charg-
ing conspiracy to restrain, monopolization, and conspiracy to monopo-
lize trade in vanadium, by cutting off Continental's sources of supply
and illegally diverting its customers. The jury gave a verdict for Union
Carbide; the court of appeals, however, held that a verdict should have
been directed for Union Carbide. One of Continental's contentions on
appeal to the Supreme Court was that it was error to exclude evidence
that a Canadian subsidiary of Union Carbide had used its position as
exclusive wartime agent of the Canadian government for the purchasing
and allocation of vanadium for Canadian industries in order to exclude
Continental from the Canadian market. The Court first stated that
6241 U.S.C. §§ 34-35 (1964).
63 381 U.S. at 670.
64 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
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there was no question about the legal validity of the action of the
Canadian government or of the Metals Controller, a government official.
Furthermore, there was no question in the case of the liability of the
Canadian Government's agent, since the subsidiary of Union Carbide,
although named in the complaint, had not been served. Although the
opinion is not altogether clear, it is apparently concerned with rebutting
the contention that any injury suffered by Continental as a result of its
exclusion from the Canadian market was due to the action of the
Canadian government and with the problem of the extraterritorial
application of the antitrust laws. The Court stressed that the only
conduct at issue was the action of Union Carbide taken within the
United States to influence its Canadian subsidiary. It refused to accept
characterization of the subsidiary's action as official:
[T]here is no indication that the Controller or any other
official within the structure of the Canadian Government ap-
proved or would have approved of joint efforts to monopolize
the production and sale of vanadium or directed that purchases
from Continental be stopped.6 5
Thus, although Union Carbide contended that the subsidiary's behavior
was within the discretion granted by the Metals Controller, the evidence
raised a question which should have been considered by the jury, namely,
"whether the loss of Continental's Canadian business was occasioned by
respondents' activities." " The fact that the subsidiary's action was
legal under Canadian law was irrelevant since conduct otherwise lawful
is unlawful if part of an unlawful conspiracy."7
Having dealt with the argument about the governmental origin of
the injury, the Court considered another argument: that Union
Carbide's activity was solicitation of governmental action exempted
under Noerr. It distinguished the case before it by characterizing
Union Carbide's conduct as private commercial activity, not involving
any attempt to procure the passage or enforcement of laws. And it
concluded rather cryptically that to subject Union Carbide to the
Sherman Act
for eliminating a competitor from the Canadian market by
exercise of the discretionary power conferred upon Electro
Met of Canada by the Canadian Government would effectuate
the purposes of the Sherman Act and would not remotely in-
fringe upon any of the constitutionally protected freedoms
spoken of in Noerr.'
The explicit treatment of the other issues in the case appears to indicate
that this holding was not intended merely to deny the Noerr exemption
65 Id. at 706.
64 Id.
67 Id. at 707.
68 Id. at 707-08.
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where the solicited executive or legislative action is that of a foreign
government.
These cases hardly offer a firm basis for predictions about the
future course of the law. Nor is their application to the steel arrange-
ment clear. There seem to be two conceptual bases for the Noerr-
Pennington defense. The first is an amalgam of variously articulated
judicial inhibitions about passing on the legality, here with respect to
the antitrust laws, of official action. An important element is the
doctrine that legal injury cannot result from valid acts of government.
The case which most clearly illustrates this is Pennington, where one
of the Court's holdings was that there could be no recovery for injury
resulting from the Secretary of Labor's action. Part of this consists
merely of judicial recognition of statutory exceptions to the antitrust
laws. For instance, in Pennington, the Secretary of Labor was per-
forming functions created for him by the Walsh-Healey Act. But lan-
guage such as that in Pennington indicates that there may be govern-
mental action which restrains trade but from which legal injury cannot
result, despite the fact that the action was not taken pursuant to any
statutory exception to the antitrust laws.' 9 Much of the reasoning in
the Continental Ore case was apparently intended to avoid characteriz-
ing the activity involved there as falling within this category, although
the government involved in the case was a foreign one."' In Parker v.
Brown, where the action was that of a state government, the Court used
a different method to reach a similar result. The case appears to stand
for the proposition that there is a presumption against interpreting the
antitrust laws in a manner that would prevent the states from making
their own independent legislative policy decisions in the area covered
by the antitrust laws.
The other articulated basis is directed toward the inducement by
private individuals of governmental action restraining trade. Based
on the practical needs of the legislative process and the constitutional
right of petition, Noerr only dealt with attempts to influence the
passage and enforcement of laws. However, the language of Pennington
makes it clear that attempts may be made to influence "public officials"
of all kinds without violating the antitrust laws.
Nevertheless, both the cases and common sense suggest that there
must be a limit to the availability of the Noerr-Pennington defense.
Not every action of every person who happens to be an official can be
immune from the reach of the antitrust laws. And presumably, though
less clearly, private individuals do not have complete freedom to ask
officials to do anything. Some requirement that the government action
69 Costilo, supra note 48, at 351-52; cf. Okefenokee Rural Elec. Membership
Corp. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 214 F2d 413 (5th Cir. 1954). Naturally, this
argument is primarily available where the litigation takes the form of an action for
damages.
70 Cf. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 358 (1909).
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be "valid" is suggested by the language of Rock Royal.7 It is stated
more clearly in Noerr's summary of the earlier cases: "[I]t has been
held that where a restraint upon trade or monopolization is the result
of valid governmental action, as opposed to private action, no violation
of the Act can be made out." 72 The inference is that there are types of
alleged governmental intervention which are insufficient to insulate the
concerted conduct of which they are a part from the antitrust laws, and
which therefore do not prevent the characterization of the conduct as
"private." This is most readily apparent in cases involving the exercise
of discretionary powers vested in private persons by the government,
where such powers are used to discriminate against competitors for
purely private ends. 3 In such cases, their conduct may be said to lose
its governmental character. This was the point of the Supreme Court's
language in Continental Ore when it stated that the action of Union
Carbide's Canadian subsidiary in discriminating against Continental
had not had the approval of the Canadian government.74
The application of this concept of "validity" is more difficult in the
case of executive action. A good deal of executive action consists of
the exercise of legislatively delegated authority in accordance with de-
fined standards and procedures, as in the case of Pennington. Com-
pliance with such standards and procedures provides an obvious and
appropriate test of validity for the purposes of the Noerr-Pennington
defense. But there are areas of executive action, such as the President's
power in foreign affairs, which, though they must have limits, do not
as readily suggest clear and easily articulated criteria of "validity."
However, mere participation by officials of the executive branch in the
negotiation of agreements in restraint of trade, cannot, without more,
be enough to lift the ban of the antitrust laws. In rejecting the rele-
vance of the fact that the restrictive activity there at issue had the
approval of federal officials, the Supreme Court said in United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., that if it held otherwise, "national policy
on such grave and important issues as this would be determined not by
Congress nor by those to whom Congress had delegated authority but
by virtual volunteers." '5 Although there were in that case procedures
under the National Industrial Recovery Act 76 which could have been
used to secure an antitrust exemption, the threat to established legis-
lative policy makes the observation just as applicable to areas where the
limits of executive power are not as well defined.
It is more difficult to detect a requirement of "validity" in the
language of the cases dealing with the exemption of solicitation of official
7 1 Text accompanying note 52 spra.
72 365 U.S. 127, 136 (1961).
73 See Costilo, supra note 48, at 340-43.
74 Text accompanying note 65 vtpra; see Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc.
v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959).
75 310 U.S. 150, 227 (1940).
70 Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195.
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action. 7 There may be circumstances in which requiring individuals,
on pain of a criminal violation or a treble damages action, to anticipate
a court's decision on the validity of the solicited official conduct would
be an excessive burden on their constitutionally protected right of
petition. But it is difficult to accept this argument in instances where
the solicited executive action conflicts with major legislative policies,
where the alternative of an appeal to the legislature is perfectly available,
and where the individual seeks to induce the executive action in order
to circumnavigate the legislature because he has found that it will not
adopt the law he wants. This is precisely the case of the steel
arrangement.
Some of these difficulties may be reduced by a consideration which
appears to underlie the cases, even if it is not always clearly stated. The
Court pointed out in Socony-Vacuum that "the typical method adopted
by Congress when it has lifted the ban of the Sherman Act is the
scrutiny and approval of designated public representatives." 78 In all the
recent cases in which the Court has allowed the exemption, the govern-
mental activity which produced the restraint was effectuated in
accordance with elaborate procedures affording all sides an opportunity
to be heard.7 9 Noerr is a prime example: in the case which first un-
equivocally established the right to solicit official action, the action
concerned was legislation, an activity whose ability to afford adequate
representation and hearing for all interests is the premise of our govern-
mental system." Similarly, the activity in Rock Royal, Parker, and
Pennington involved careful, statutorily prescribed scrutiny by ad-
ministrative agencies. By contrast, there was no such supervision and
procedure in Continental Ore. None of the opinions specifically men-
tions this factor in its reasoning, though several describe the procedures
in the statement of facts. It cannot therefore be claimed that it is deter-
minative. But, where the legality of the deflection with the aid of the
executive branch of legislative policy as important as that of the anti-
trust laws is at issue, it should be accorded substantial weight.
B. The Application of the Noerr-Pennington Defense
to the Steel Arrangement
If the steel arrangement is to receive the benefit of the Noerr-
Pennington exemption, it must be because the concerted conduct was
solicitation of government action with respect to the passage or enforce-
ment of laws, or of valid executive action, or because the arrangement
may be said to have been brought into being by valid governmental
action.
77 Text accompanying note 63 supra.
78 310 U.S. at 227 n.60.
79 Costilo, supra note 48, at 343-46.
80 But see Walden, More about Noerr-Lobbying, Antitrust and the Right to
Petition, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1211 (1967) for a criticism of the ability of the legis-
lative process to withstand the onslaughts of concerted lobbying.
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1. Solicitation of Legislative Action
The argument may be made that the negotiation of the steel
arrangement was so closely intertwined with the campaign for quota
legislation as to be a part of it, for legal purposes. The behavior of the
American steel industry was certainly as well tailored as it could be to
support this argument.
Contacts between the steel industry and Congressmen were close
after the shelving of the quota bill as well as while it was still under
consideration by the Senate Finance Committee. The industry's im-
mediate public response to the Japanese offer of July, 1968, was to
urge the resumption of consideration of quota legislation.8 Letters
explaining the industry's position were sent to the Chairmen of the
Senate Finance Committee and the House Committee on Ways and
Means.' When the arrangement was finally settled, it was announced
jointly by the chairmen of the two committees.s3 At the same time, the
President of the American Iron and Steel Institute wrote to the Chair-
man of the House Ways and Means Committee expressing the indus-
try's continuing apprehensiveness and urging once again the resumption
of quota legislation."4
This impressive catalogue of evidence amply demonstrates a close
connection between the campaign for quota legislation and the negotia-
tion of the steel arrangement, but it hardly suffices to eliminate the
very substantial difference between them. For the State Department
and the foreign producers, the point of the arrangement was to avoid
legislation. The American industry accepted it because it had tempo-
rarily given up hope on the quota bill. Although the two courses of
action were in a sense parallel, they were also mutually exclusive
alternatives, and participation in one cannot be termed solicitation of
the other.
2. Solicitation of Executive Action
A stronger case for the exemption of the steel arrangement may be
based on the participation of State Department officials. The contention
must be either that the American industry did no more than solicit action
by the State Department, and that therefore its part in any conspiracy
that may have taken place was immunized; or that the whole arrange-
ment was immunized because of the causal relation with the government
officials. This leads to the inquiry whether the character of the State
Department officials' conduct was adequate to confer the exemption.
81 Wall Street Journal, July 12, 1968, at 5, col. 2.
82 Letter from John P. Roche, President of the American Iron and Steel Insti-
tute, to Representative Wilbur D. Mills, July 11, 1968; Letter from John P. Roche to
Senator Russell B. Long, July 11, 1968.
83 House Committee on Ways and Means, Senate Finance Committee, Joint Press
Release, Jan. 14, 1969.
84 Letter from John P. Roche, President of the American Iron and Steel Institute,
to Representative Wilbur D. Mills, Jan. 15, 1969.
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The question is not so much whether the executive branch may take
action of this nature, but whether the fact that it has done so, or has
been asked to do so, is enough to lift the ban of the antitrust laws from
the resulting restraint of trade.
Whatever power the executive possesses to take an action must be
derived either from the Constitution or by delegation from Congress.8
Furthermore,
[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its
lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitu-
tional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress
over the matter."6
The power to "regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among
the several states," is explicitly vested by the Constitution in Con-
gress.8 7  This power includes the power to impose limits on imports,
and legislative policy in this respect has been clearly established.
With the passage of the Trade Agreements Act of 1934,88 Congress
adopted a policy favorable to the expansion of foreign trade. The
Act authorized the President to negotiate reciprocal lowering of tariffs
and other trade barriers with other countries. Specific Congressional
approval of reductions was not required, but reductions were limited to
fifty per cent of 1934 levels. The authority given to the President to
negotiate agreements was only temporary, but has been renewed
periodically since then. It was renewed for the twelfth time by the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962.1 That Act was clearly designed to be
a free trade measure.90 It enlarged the authority of the President to
negotiate tariff reductions in trade agreements with other countries;
it changed the "safeguards against injury" provisions of the law; and
it added an "adjustment assistance" program to firms and employees
harmed by imports. Although the President's negotiating power under
85 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952).
86 Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
87 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
88 Act of June 12, 1934, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943, as amended, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351-54
(1964).
89 Act of Oct. 11, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (codified primarily in
19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991 (1965)).
90 In his message to Congress on January 25, 1962, President Kennedy expressed
the purpose of the Act:
Once given a fair and equal opportunity to compete in oversea markets, and
once subject to healthy competition from oversea manufacturers for our own
markets, American management and labor will have additional reason to
maintain competitive costs and prices, modernize their plants, and increase
their productivity. The discipline of the world marketplace is an excellent
measure of efficiency and a force to stability. To try to shield American
industry from the discipline of foreign competition would isolate our domestic
price level from world prices, encourage domestic inflation, reduce our exports
still further, and invite less desirable governmental solutions. 108 CoNG.
REc. 953 (1962).
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the Act expired on June 30, 1967,1 the other provisions of the Act re-
main in effect.
The Act specifically provides that the President may take remedial
action in certain contingencies resulting from a high level of imports.
The nature of these contingencies is carefully defined, as are the pro-
cedures which must accompany the finding of their existence, and the
remedial steps which may be taken.
The two most important contingencies are threats to national secu-
rity and to domestic industries. Section 232 of the Act' requires the
Director of the Office of Emergency Planning to investigate the effects
on the national security of the import of a given article on request of
the head of any department or agency, or of an interested party, or on
his own motion. If the Director finds that the imports are impairing
the national security, and unless the President determines otherwise,
the President "shall take such action, and for such time, as he deems
necessary" to correct the situation. The section lays out the con-
siderations which must be taken into account in determining the effect
on national security.
The other major contingency provided for by the Act is the situ-
ation where tariff concessions create such a rise in the imports of an
article as to threaten the domestic industry which makes competing
articles, or a firm within that industry, or workers within such a firm. 3
The Tariff Commission is required to make findings regarding the
existence of such contingencies on the request of the President, the
House Ways and Means Committee, the Senate Finance Committee, or
of affected firms or workers, or on its own motion. 4 If the request and
finding is limited to particular firms or groups of workers, these may
then seek adjustment assistance from the Secretaries of Commerce or
Labor.- If the finding of the Tariff Commission relates to the entire
industry, the President may have adjustment assistance provided to
firms and groups of workers, but he may also take steps to reduce the
imports."6 For this purpose, he may either unilaterally impose appro-
priate duties or other import restrictions (presumably including
quotas), 97 or may instead "negotiate international agreements with
foreign countries" limiting imports of the relevant article. 8
9119 U.S.C. § 1821(a) (1) (1964).
2Id. §1862.
3 Id.§ 1901(b), (c).
941Id. § 1901 (b).
95 Id. §§ 1911-20, 1931-78.
96 Id. § 1902.
s9 Id. § 1981.
98 Id. § 1982 (italics added). This section of the statute seems to contemplate
the negotiation of agreements like the Cotton Textile Agreement. Long-Term
Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles, Feb. 9, 1962, [1962]
3 U.S.T. 2672, T.I.A.S. No. 5240, as authorized by 7 U.S.C. § 1854 (1964). The
Cotton Textile Arrangement was initially negotiated bilaterally with the Japanese.
See Question of Cotton Textile Exports to the United States, 36 DEP'T STATE BULL.
218 (1957). At that time, the Administration was faced with charges that it was "a
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Thus Congress has clearly delineated the procedures to be fol-
lowed and the remedies to be applied when the problems arise which the
steel industry claims support the need for limits on the import of steel:
threats to national security, and threats to a domestic industry. It has
elaborately stated the way in which the kind of relief the steel industry
seeks may be granted, and what the role of the executive may be in
granting it. It is probable that the contention that steel imports con-
stitute a threat to national security within the meaning of the Act, or
that the industry's problems are "a result in major part of concessions
granted under trade agreements" would not be sustained by the statu-
torily prescribed investigation. In that case, either the situation must
continue to be governed by the existing legislation, or new legislation
must be sought.
The course that the executive has chosen to follow in the present
case has been deliberately to avoid seeking a new law while covertly
side-stepping the explicit procedures and purposes of the old. This
hardly seems a strong case for turning to the participation of govern-
ment officials to immunize from the antitrust laws the resulting restraint
of trade.
It may be further argued that the steel arrangement does fall within
an acknowledged executive power, the power of the President in foreign
affairs. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.," the Su-
preme Court described those powers in very broad terms:
In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated,
delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.
His was "the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power . . . as the
sole organ of the federal government in the field of international rela-
tions." "' While the primary activity this language appears to refer to
is the representation of the United States in dealing with other sover-
eigns, the President presumably may, as an incident of this power,
communicate with whatever public or private foreign parties he wishes.
The passage of steel quota legislation would very likely have had inter-
national repercussions, whose extent would not necessarily have been
limited exclusively to foreign commerce. But this should not be taken
to permit the executive, by informal and unscrutinized action, to flout
clear, controlling legislative policy in the area of foreign commerce, over
nameless arrangement outside the law." Secretary Dulles's News Conference, Feb. 5,
1957, 36 DEP'T STATE BULL. 300, 303-04 (1957). However, in 1962 the United States
negotiated a multilateral agreement entered into by a number of GATT members,
under the auspices of GATT. The 1962 agreement provides for consultation between
countries when imports disrupt or threaten to disrupt markets. Administrative pro-
cedure requires justification of any requests for limitation on the basis of actual facts
and figures. The agreement is supervised by the Cotton Textiles Committee.
99299 U.S. 304 (1936).
100 Id. at 319.
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which Congress has undoubted power, while simultaneously nullifying
the prohibitions of the antitrust laws.""'
It is worth noting that underlying arguments about the faults of
the steel arrangement viewed in terms of its consistency with the rele-
vant legislative and constitutional grants of power is another, more
concrete consideration. The question of limiting imports of steel is one
which has profound consequences far beyond its effects on the economic
viability of the domestic steel producers. The question is more than
one of changing long entrenched and clearly articulated legislative
policies. One hundred and sixty pages of hearings are testimony to the
wide variety of interests affected." 2 While many of these are users of
imported steel, others are those who would be affected by retaliatory
limits on American produced items. It is true that of all the means of
imposing limits on imports, "voluntary" nongovernmental restraints
such as those used in the steel arrangement are probably the ones which
are likely to be least damaging to free trade in the long run since they
prevent resort to legislation and are easily terminated. But this cannot
justify taking the decision out of the forum where all may be heard, and
leaving it to a course of secret negotiations where only the beneficiaries
are represented. The users of imported steel were well represented at
the hearings on the quota legislation, and many expressed their views
by telegram.' They were not consulted at all in the negotiation of the
steel arrangement. The State Department received only one complaint
(from the Independent Wire Drawers' Association) during the negotia-
tion of the arrangement.
This subterranean process of decision-making may be contrasted
not only with the legislative process but also with the procedure that
would have been followed had remedial action been sought under the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The Tariff Commission, equipped with
101 Cf. Sayre, The Constitutionality of the Trade Agreements Act, 39 CoLum. L.
REv. 751, 755 (1939), stating that in making executive agreements, the President
"must act scrupulously within the laws and conform to the policies already established
by the Congress.' It should be added that the steel arrangement is also inconsistent
with United States participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61
Stat., pt. 5, at All, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, entered into by executive agreement by Presi-
dent Truman pursuant to the Trade Agreements Act of 1934. Proclamation No.
2761A, 12 Fed. Reg. 8863 (1947). The foundation of GATT is the most favored
nation principle found in Article I: when a party extends concessions to another
party, it must also extend them to all other parties. There are provisions for the
suspension of these concessions in defined circumstances, including threats to domestic
industry (article XIX), balance of payments difficulties (article XII), and threats
to national security (article XXI). Measures taken under articles XIX and XII
must be discussed with the other contracting parties, and the national security excep-
tion is extremely narrowly drawn. It is clear that practices such as that followed in
the steel arrangement, where government officials negotiate "voluntary" non-govern-
mental restraints directly with foreign industries, violate the scheme of GATT.
o102Hearings, supra note 7, at 818-978. Some flavor of the discussion may be
derived from Senator Long's remark in connection with the effect on employment of
quota legislation that "[s]o far as I am concerned, if we lose a few jobs in the rice
field and gain some in the steel mills, that would be perfectly all right.' Id. at 835.
103 Id. at 971-78.
128 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
the full investigative powers of an administrative agency," 4 would have
conducted an investigation to see if the statutorily prescribed standards
were met. All sides would have been heard, and an informed judgment
would have been made.
Parties injured by the steel arrangement are not, of course, totally
helpless. They may seek legislative relief, or they too may go seeking
their own private understandings with the Administration.' 5 The way
may be open for countless other "voluntary" arrangements.
V. CONCLUSION
It thus appears that national policy has in a sense been "determined
not by Congress nor by those to whom Congress had delegated author-
ity but by virtual volunteers," '-6 or, to revert to the language of Noerr,
that the steel arrangement was the result of private rather than valid
governmental action.
The issue is unlikely ever to be formally resolved. The govern-
ment will probably seek more such arrangements rather than encourage
or acquiesce in the examination of the one which already exists. Sup-
porters of free trade with a sense of the political may prefer the flexi-
bility and fragility of voluntary restraints to quota legislation. But
against these factors must be set the need to ensure that national policy
in the field of regulation of commerce does not come to be fixed by
unscrutinized discussion between individual domestic and foreign inter-
ests and an executive acting outside of its legislative and constitutional
authority.
Detlef G. Lehnardt
10419 U.S.C. § 1335 (1964).
105 "We're going to go along with this temporarily, until we see whether it
hampers our business," says one East Coast steel user who buys about 40% of his
steel overseas. "But if it does hurt us, we're going to go to Washington and beat
on literally everybody's door," he adds. Wall Street Journal, Jan. 16, 1969, at 12,
col. 1.
108United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 227 (1940).
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